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This thesis examines what kind of moral agency and moral patiency an android Lore is 
granted in the American science-fiction television show Star Trek: The Next Generation. The 
show lasted seven seasons from 1987 to 1994 and was followed by four movies from 1994 to 
2002.  It follows the starship Enterprise and its crew on various explorational and political 
missions. Lore is the brother of the Enterprise crewmember Lieutenant Commander Data and 
he appears in four episodes: “Datalore” (season 1, episode 12), “Brothers” (season 4, episode 
3), “Descent Part 1” (season 6, episode 26), and “Descent Part 2” (season 7, episode 1), all of 
which are examined in this thesis.1 Particular focus is directed at “Brothers”, because it 
displays the most nuanced depiction of Lore and his treatment. 
“Datalore” introduces Lore as the Enterprise finds him disassembled on the planet 
Omicron Theta. Data opts for reassembling him and they do so; Lore then attempts to gain 
Data’s trust, yet he fails and consecutively attempts to destroy the Enterprise by 
impersonating Data. Consecutively, he fails again, as Data manages to stop him by 
transporting him to space. In “Brothers”, the androids’ creator Doctor Soong inadvertently 
captures Lore, attempting to only capture Data to speak with him. When the three are 
reunited on a secluded planet, Lore argues with Soong extensively over his treatment in the 
past. Eventually he murders Soong and steals an emotion chip meant for Data as 
compensation for Soong’s past actions. “Descent Part 1” and “Descent Part 2” follow Lore’s 
attempt to destroy the Federation and establish a new dominance of artificial life-forms with 
the assistance of the Borg. He feeds Data negative emotions and disables his ethical program 
to persuade him to join the cause and succeeds momentarily; however, when the program is 
reactivated, Data terminates Lore. 
In these four episodes other characters treat Lore in morally problematic ways, 
questioning his moral patiency continuously and his moral agency occasionally. Moral 
patiency means that how one is treated is moral or immoral whereas moral agency means that 
one’s actions towards others are either moral or immoral. This thesis examines Lore’s moral 
status – an umbrella term for having both moral agency and patiency – by examining how 
different characters treat him. David J Gunkel notes: “Human beings not only get to define 
 
1 This thesis utilizes the pronoun “he” to refer to Lore. It personifies and genders Lore, which makes it possibly 
controversial. The utilization of “he” is based on two facts: 1) Almost all of the characters in the show refer to 
Lore as “he”, except for a few notable cases of “it”. 2) Lore is constructed to be male in both physique and 
voice, and his performance is by a male actor. 




the standard qualifying criteria, which are often based on and derived from their own abilities 
and experiences, but also nominate themselves both judge and jury for all claims on 
personhood made by or on behalf of others” (67). This thesis argues the idea can be 
additionally extended to moral agency and patiency. Humans are those who decide the moral 
status of others, and those decisions become apparent in the treatment of those others. That is 
why Lore’s treatment is the basis for examining his moral status.  
Previous research into the show has been focused on the android Data’s quest to 
become human and the antagonistic collective of the Borg, as well as representations of 
gender and race.2 This thesis adds to the research of the show’s representation of AI, 
currently focused solely on Data, by examining Lore who has not been researched. The goal 
is to gain a better overall understanding of the representation of AI in The Next Generation. 
Although it is an older show, its topics are now more relevant than ever since autonomous AI 
is turning science fiction into reality. In addition, the show was and is still massively popular. 
It has inspired creators for decades, making its ideas and representations widespread, and its 
popularity is rising again since the show’s sequel Picard will be released in 2020. The rise of 
real-life AI and the show’s popularity are why analysing the previously ignored avenues of 
the show’s AI is important.  
This thesis applies philosophical theories that focus on the question of machine 
morality and its problems as its theory base. These include the definition moral agency and 
patiency and its application to machines, as well as machine consciousness in the view of the 
show, the instrumental theory of technology and functionalism. Both the instrumental theory 
and functionalism are represented in characters’ opinions, whereas the other theories are 
relevant for establishing the terminology of the analysis. After introducing these the thesis 




2.1. Machine Moral Agency and Patiency 
 
Luciano Floridi and J.W. Sanders define moral agents as entities whose actions are moral and 
moral patients as entities towards which moral actions can be done (349-50). Stated in 
simpler terms, moral agents can do moral and immoral deeds, and actions done to moral 
 
2 See Consalvo. 




patients can be moral or immoral. The standard position of moral status means that “all 
entities that qualify as moral agents also qualify as moral patients and vice versa”; contrarily, 
the nonstandard position means that having moral patiency does not automatically grant 
moral agency to a being (Floridi and Sanders 350).  
Gunkel introduces two different outcomes of using the standard position in research 
of AI and ethics: it has been a justification for either excluding the machine from moral 
patiency completely, or for arguing that if a machine obtains moral agency, its moral patiency 
must be considered as well (95-96). 
David Levy likewise argues for the latter outcome. His focus is the question of 
machine patiency, which he forms as: “Is it ethical to treat robots in such-and-such a way?” 
(209). Levy’s stance is that robots will be treated in a somewhat similar way to humans 
because they have consciousness, and because of this similar treatment we will treat them 
likewise in other ways as well, “for example by regarding these robots as having rights” 
(214). Gunkel explains that for Levy, what separates those deserving ethical treatment and 
those who do not is consciousness (97). This raises the important issue of defining 
consciousness that is addressed in the next chapter.   
 
2.2. The Consciousness of Machines 
 
Comprehensively defining consciousness appears impossible. Gunkel even claims that “if 
there is any general agreement among philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists, 
neurobiologists, AI researchers, and robotics engineers regarding consciousness, it is that 
there is little or no agreement when it comes to defining and characterizing the concept” (54-
55). Different criteria have been suggested for consciousness, yet they all fail in some way or 
another. Nevertheless, consciousness must be defined to be able to discuss the moral agency 
and moral patiency of machines.  
Victor Grech argues that in “the Star Trek canon consciousness resides within the 
physical brain” (33). He gives an example from Star Trek: The Original Series where 
Spock’s brain is removed, leaving his body unconscious and his brain conscious. It follows 
the classic mind/body argument, where the mind is something separate in nature from the 
physical body. In addition, the mind appears as an emergent property since it emerges from 
the brain while it is not reducible to it.  
Thus, consciousness seems to be understood as an emergent property of the brain the 
Star Trek universe. This causes an issue when considering Lore and Data, since their brains 




are not biological, and instead artificially constructed positronic nets. Can these positronic 
brains produce similar emergent consciousness? When one examines how other characters 
treat Lore and Data, it appears they believe that consciousness can be deduced from external 
actions and that the two androids are indeed conscious. For example, when Chief Engineer 
Argyle activates Lore in “Datalore”, he explains that the nonreacting Lore has not displayed 
any “signs of consciousness” (00:18:01-00:18:03). When Lore eventually awakens and 
speaks, the other characters begin to consider him conscious. Therefore, it appears the 
characters believe even a positronic brain can produce emergent consciousness. 
This thesis adopts the same position to consciousness as the characters: Lore and 
Data are both conscious, because they act so. It is done so that the argument of consciousness 
is manageable in size for this thesis as well as to keep the focus of the discussion on the 
moral status of machines instead of metaphysical discussions about consciousness. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that deducing internal states from external actions is a problematic 
and philosophically questionable stance. External actions are not an undeniable indication of 
an intentional, conscious state; Lore, for example, could only be programmed to act 
“conscious”. This decision, therefore, is not directly generalizable to larger concepts beyond 
the discussion of this show in this thesis.  
 
2.3. The Instrumental Theory 
 
The instrumental theory of technology, developed by Martin Heidegger, explains that 
technological artefacts are generally understood to be tools (Gunkel 25). Gunkel defines a 
tool as “a prothesis or extension of human agency” (31), which highlights that they are 
utilized by the morally responsible humans and do not have agency themselves. Complex 
technological artefacts such as the androids Lore and Data, however, cannot be considered 
tools; they are rather machines because they “occupy … the place of agency” (Gunkel 32) in 
some way or another since these machines replace the humans instead of being utilized by 
them. 
The instrumental theory, therefore, is not compatible with the redistributed place of 
agency of machines. In addition, the theory is increasingly problematic due to its 
anthropocentrism. Anthropocentric theories are inherently dependent on the assumed place 
and value of humans. Gunkel identifies the two main problems of anthropocentrism: it relies 
on the definition of “human” and as a centrism it is automatically exclusive (29-30). How 
“human” is defined has always been under change and it has been an inseparable part of 




ideological and social arguments (29), making the instrumental theory a subjective, political 
tool for its advocates. The problem of anthropocentrism’s exclusivity is two-fold: Firstly, the 
question of who is allowed to decide the membership of others is very subjective (Gunkel 
30), as was discussed in the introduction. Secondly, the division into members and non-
members is violent, despite the used criteria (Gunkel 30).  
 
2.4. Functionalism of Machine Agency 
 
As an approach to machine agency, functionalism refuses to answer the question of whether 
machines can be moral agents, claiming it is not necessary for the examination of “real-world 
consequences of increasingly autonomous machine decision making” (Gunkel 75). The 
theory’s attention is on the effects of moral acts, especially on the actions of machines 
towards humans, and functionalist approaches mainly attempt to ensure “the humane 
treatment of human beings” when considering these machine actions (Gunkel 85).  
Gunkel recognizes two problems with functionalism out of which the first one is 
important for this thesis. The problem is that despite the fact that functionalist approaches 
allow other beings in addition to humans to be moral agents, it is only done to protect humans 
(85). These approaches, then, examine “the responsible programming of machines” (Gunkel 
85) in an anthropocentric way. The aforementioned anthropocentrism, concerned with the 
status and value of humans, is a problem for other beings since their value is largely 
neglected from consideration, which in this case is moral consideration.  
 
3. The Moral Patiency and Agency of Lore 
 
This section examines Lore’s treatment by characters essential for analysis. First, it 
investigates the treatment of Lore by his brother Data. Second, Lore’s treatment by his 
creator Doctor Soong is explored. Finally, the section studies how Lore himself observes his 
status and how he argues he should be treated. Data and Soong were selected due to their 
unique viewpoints: Data is another android, Soong is the androids’ creator. Lore’s stance on 
himself was chosen because it is contradictory.  




3.1. Data’s Hypocritical Stance on Lore’s Moral Status 
 
This chapter examines how Data treats Lore. Firstly, Data’s own moral status must be 
determined to understand whether he can decide others’ moral statuses. Secondly, the chapter 
examines whether Data treats Lore as a moral agent and what is problematic and 
controversial about this treatment. Finally, it examines Data’s increasingly questionable 
stance on Lore’s moral patiency which is caused by Lore beginning to oppose Data.   
Data, similar to Lore, is an android built by Doctor Soong, and he and Lore are 
considered brothers. Data is the younger brother since he was constructed last, yet the 
androids are, in Soong’s words, “virtually identical, except for a bit of programming” 
(“Brothers” 00:31:46-00:31:54). They have two programming differences: Lore has emotions 
whereas Data does not, and Data has an explicitly mentioned ethical program whereas Lore’s 
is never discussed.3  
Data has both moral agency and patiency which are never doubted by the 
crewmembers of the Enterprise.4 His actions are always deemed his own and hurting him is 
viewed as immoral. For example, Chief Engineer Argyle explains in “Datalore” that they 
must examine Data’s physique to make Lore functional, and that it must be done “without 
disassembling you [Data], of course” (00:14:11-00:14:15). This reveals that the others 
consider disassembling Data to be self-evidently against his rights. Data’s moral status is 
questioned once in “A Measure of a Man” (season 2, episode 9), when Starfleet argues that 
he is their property without rights; Data, however, wins the trial and becomes a legally self-
determinate person with a complete moral status. 
Data initially appears to grant Lore the same moral status he has been granted. On 
their first encounter, he calls Lore “he”, disregarding the fact that Lore is merely a 
disassembled android body at the moment (“Datalore” 00:12:20-00:12:22). Hence Data is the 
first character to personify Lore and consider him conscious. Continuing in the same manner, 
Data deems Lore is a moral agent since he does not attribute any of Lore’s actions to 
programming or Soong. Data appears to believe Lore to be his equal, yet further analysis 
reveals Data’s contradictory ideas. 
 
3 Because the show does not discuss Lore’s ethical programming despite mentioning a difference in the 
androids’ programs, two opposing readings are formed: either Lore has an ethical program, which turns the 
discussion to machine ethics, or he does not, which turns the discussion to the metaphysical nature of morals. 
Since both topics are so extensive, they are excluded from the analysis.  
4 Except for Doctor Pulaski in season 2, who does not initially recognise Data to be a person, yet who eventually 
changes her stance. 




Data’s first double standard concerns moral agency, because he views Lore as a moral 
agent yet excuses his own responsibility by appealing to programming. Data claims that 
emotions were responsible for how he hurt his friend Geordi (“Descent Part 2” 00:43:22-
00:43:25), and those emotions were fed to him by Lore, who is constantly under the influence 
of those same emotions. Data does not, controversially, extend this shift in responsibility to 
Lore; Lore is in control of himself despite the emotions.  
Data’s second double standard is that he believes he himself is a moral patient 
whereas Lore is not. When the crew first discovers Lore’s disassembled body, not knowing 
who or what it is, Data claims the body requires reassembling. His motivation is questionable 
at best, as he demands: “It is very important for me to know that [the android can become 
alive], sir. I never dreamed it was possible that I might find some link with a form like my 
own” (“Datalore” 00:12:31-00:12:43). Instead of a person with a right to live, Lore appears as 
a means to an end for Data to uncover his own past. 
When Lore changes from this tool of personal discovery to a threat to the Enterprise 
in “Datalore” and to the entire Federation in “Descent Part 2”, Data ceases to consider even 
the possibility that Lore might be a moral patient. In “Datalore”, he is responsible as the 
senior officer for ordering Lore to be transported into space. In “Descent Part 2”, he shoots 
Lore in self-defence, incapacitating him, which is in itself unproblematic. Yet, despite 
rendering Lore harmless by the blast, Data terminates his conscious state and informs Captain 
Picard that Lore “must be disassembled so that he is no longer a threat” (00:41:24-00:41:28). 
Data knows that disassembly is essentially the same as death for an android. He does not 
believe Lore requires a trial and appealing to Lore’s threatening nature to humans as support 
for this judgement makes Data support functionalism introduced in the theory section, which 
further reduces Lore’s moral status. Data appears even more extreme in “Brothers” where he 
argues against his brother’s self-conscious state and free will by begging Soong to “not 
reactive” Lore from a zombie-state (00:27:29-00:27:32). Although Data argues both that he 
has a right to free will (“A Measure of a Man”) and that he has a right to risk his own life 
(“Descent Part 1”) – implying that he is both alive and a person with rights – he does not 
grant these rights to Lore and denies him moral patiency. It becomes another double standard.  
Therefore, Data does not treat Lore as of an equal moral status despite suggesting in 
“Datalore” that Lore could be another him. He explains to Picard that if they use “it” to refer 
Lore, both androids appear as things instead of persons (“Datalore” 00:19:12-00:19:18), yet 
regardless of this Data himself treats Lore as a thing with no moral patiency on several 




occasions. These double standards are unexpected when one considers that Data is another AI 
who has had to argue for his own moral status.  
 
3.2. Soong’s Creator Responsibility over Lore 
 
This chapter examines what kind of a moral status Doctor Noonien Soong, the cyberneticist 
who built the androids, grants to Lore. Soong has a full moral status as a human, thus he can 
decide Lore’s moral status as a member of the group. This is why his motivation for creating 
Lore is studied first; it is the initial decision on his status. After this, Soong’s stance on Lore’s 
moral agency is explored. Finally, the chapter analyses Soong’s uncertain opinion of Lore’s 
moral patiency.    
Soong’s motivation for building the androids is morally problematic because he 
appears to have initially viewed them as objects. He compares his desire to build Data, and 
assumedly Lore as well, to that of Michelangelo creating his statues (“Brothers” 00:24:25-
00:24:52), making the androids parallel to works of art and objects instead of persons. His 
view, however, gradually changes in “Brothers”. He takes a paternal role with Data whereas 
with Lore he takes the role of the creator, and, because of this, Lore is more of an object to 
Soong that Data is. This causes Soong’s double standard in the treatment of the brothers. 
The issue of moral agency is especially important with Soong, since he is the only 
other character who questions Lore’s moral agency besides Lore himself. He has a double 
standard with the moral agency of the brothers, which originates from the difference between 
creator and father: Lore is not a moral agent, because Soong has the responsibility over his 
actions as the creator, whereas Data is a moral agent, because Soong is more of a father for 
him. Soong explains that he has granted Data free will: “I gave you the ability to choose 
whatever you wanted. To do whatever you wanted” (Brothers” 00:23:14-00:23:21). 
Therefore, he is clearly no longer in control of Data’s actions and it leads to what Andreas 
Matthias calls a “responsibility gap”, that is, “the manufacturer/operator of the machine is in 
principle not capable of predicting the future machine behaviour any more, and thus cannot 
be held morally responsible or liable for it” (175). Soong allows any moral responsibility to 
go to Data.  
That, nevertheless, is not the case with Lore, despite the fact that Soong is faced with 
a similar “responsibility gap” because Lore is also an autonomous AI. Instead of allowing 
Lore moral responsibility, Soong fills the gap himself by claiming he is still in control as the 
creator. For example, when he is reactivating Lore from the zombie-state and Data begs him 




not to, Soong responds with: “In any case, he’ll obey me. He always did” (“Brothers” 
00:27:39-00:27:44). Although Lore has rebelled against him on numerous occasions by this 
time, he nevertheless believes he is in control.  
This is what causes Soong to take responsibility over several of Lore’s actions, which 
in turn denies Lore moral agency. In “Brothers”, Soong claims that in the past, when they 
were still living together with the colonists, Lore had not been “functioning properly” 
(00:31:22-00:31:24) and that he had been “unstable” (00:32:16-00:32:23), which show that 
he decided, and still decides, when Lore is working appropriately and when not. This 
instability is also what forced Soong to disassemble Lore, because he had become a threat to 
the colonists they were living with. By this, Soong advocates functionalism, where securing 
human safety is the most important reason to control machines (Gunkel 84-85) – an argument 
that is identical to Data’s. Supporting it reduces Lore’s moral status to non-existent, because 
Lore becomes a mere apparatus completely under its creator’s control.  
Since Soong treats Lore as not a moral agent, Lore could not be a moral patient either 
if Soong supported the standard position of morality. His position on the android’s moral 
patiency, however, is not clear, because of two issues. Firstly, he treats Data as both a moral 
agent and moral patient and therefore could support the standard position. Secondly, Soong 
appears ambiguous on Lore’s moral patiency: On one hand, he frequently ignores all moral 
responsibility to him. On the other hand, he occasionally expresses regret over his immoral 
acts towards him.  
Soong periodically neglects his responsibility as a moral agent to Lore who is a 
potential moral patient. In the past, he had disassembled Lore without concern for his right to 
life by appealing to human safety. When he explains Lore’s bitterness to Data, Soong asserts 
that “he wasn’t given the chance you and I were given. To live” (“Brothers” 00:35:21-
00:35:26), distancing himself from his actions. Similarly, when Lore demands to know why 
Soong didn’t “fix” him (“Brothers” 00:32:32-00:32:37), Soong deflects Lore’s argument for 
moral treatment by appealing to logic to explain why he built Data instead (00:32:35-
00:32:41). He also excuses his own failures when building Lore by claiming it was “the 
emotion” in Lore that “turned and twisted” (“Brothers” 00:33:30-00:33:40) instead of 
admitting that his own questionable actions and possible programming errors caused Lore to 
become emotionally unstable.   
Yet Soong is not completely against Lore’s moral patiency. He regrets what happened 
in the past, as he claims he was “plagued by what went wrong” (“Brothers” 00:33:15-
00:33:20). He also damages his argument for the logic of building Data by claiming he 




nevertheless planned to repair Lore (“Brothers” 00:32:41-00:32:45). The most important 
argument for Lore’s moral patiency that Soong makes, however, is when he indirectly admits 
that when he disassembled Lore, he essentially killed him: “I didn’t know you were alive” 
(“Brothers” 00:38:57-00:38:59). It is an acknowledgement that he does have moral 
responsibilities towards Lore that he failed to fulfil in the past. Consequently, Soong can 
never fulfil them as in a cruel twist of fate the confession causes Lore to become violent and 
murder him. Nevertheless, it makes it possible that Soong supports the nonstandard position 
of morality with Lore. 
Soong, therefore, is adamant that Lore is not moral agent, whereas his moral patiency 
is possible, which strongly suggests that Soong supports the nonstandard position of morality. 
His overall stance, however, is questionable. He has a double standard with the androids, 
advocating the standard position with Data and the nonstandard position with Lore. He also 
diminishes Lore’s position as a person by supporting functionalism whereas he directs no 
such argument at Data. It appears that Soong’s opinion is dependent on how “successful” his 
creations are by his own standards, which in itself is anthropocentric and therefore 
problematic.   
 
3.3. Lore Against Agency and For Patiency 
 
This chapter examines Lore’s opinion of his own moral status. It proceeds by first analysing 
his more contradictory arguments of moral agency and then his clearer arguments for moral 
patiency. Finally, the chapter briefly analyses how even academic scholarship ignores Lore’s 
arguments.  
Lore acts as a moral agent in “Datalore”, “Descent Part 1” and “Descent Part 2”, 
never questioning his own agency and taking responsibility for his actions. The appearance of 
Doctor Soong in “Brothers”, however, causes Lore to question his moral agency, since it 
allows him to shift responsibility for his actions to Soong. Initially, Lore acknowledges he 
was in control of his actions by declaring: “I would have proven myself worthy to you if 
you’d just given me a chance” (“Brothers” 00:31:01-00:32:06). He believes he could have 
affected the outcome by acting and does not mention any programming faults that he himself 
could not fix. Nonetheless, Lore relinquishes his moral agency almost immediately, as he 
demands an answer from Soong to the question: “Why didn’t you just fix me? It was within 
your power to fix me” (00:32:32-00:32:37). Brokenness undoes his moral agency because 
Lore ceases to be in control of his actions and the responsibility for the faults shifts to Soong. 




Lore implicitly employs the instrumental definition of technology, where the human creator 
is responsible for the status of the apparatus, although it cannot be applied since Lore is an 
autonomous machine that renders the definition obsolete. Lore’s claim for not having moral 
agency, therefore, is inherently flawed.  
While he denies his moral agency himself, Lore nonetheless believes he is a moral 
patient, which shows he supports the nonstandard position of morality. This becomes 
apparent when he attempts numerous times to highlight his immoral treatment by expressing 
distress and anger over his treatment as well as mocking other people’s words.   
The strongest argument for moral patiency Lore presents is the argument he has with 
Soong about having been disassembled in the past:  
LORE:  You did what you had to do? What kind of an answer is that? 
SOONG:  The only one I can give you. You were not functioning properly.  
(“Brothers” 00:31:15-00:31:24) 
Lore acts amusedly, with melodramatic hand gestures, and this appears exaggerated even for 
such a sarcastic, emotionally volatile character. This way of acting suggests that he believes 
he has been mistreated and that the given answer is not only inadequate but also offensive as 
a moral justification. He therefore believes he is a moral patient and he attempts to force 
Soong to admit that disassembling him was immoral. He insists on the argument, despite the 
lack of progress and the overall attention beginning to turn to Data, by angrily asserting to 
Soong: “You disassembled me. You took me apart” (“Brothers” 00:31:34-00:31:39). The less 
animated, but angrier argument is a differently styled attempt to make Soong admit his 
offense. 
Lore’s arguments formatted like this, nonetheless, do not succeed. To further 
highlight the injustice he feels, Lore changes his approach by focusing on what he was denied 
despite having a right to it instead of what was done to him. When Lore demands to know 
why Soong did not repair him – the aforementioned argument that denies his moral agency – 
Lore also shows that he believes that, as a moral agent, Soong has a responsibility to him as a 
moral patient. This approach continues when he declares to Soong: “You didn’t fill Data with 
substandard parts, did you, old man? No. That honour was bestowed upon me. You owe me, 
old man. Not him. Me” (“Brothers” 00:38:23-00:28:37). “Substandard parts” are evidence 
that Soong is at least partly responsible for what failed in Lore’s construction and Lore 
attempts to make Soong see the injustice in that. More importantly, Lore claims Soong owes 
him; it is a forceful demonstration that he believes he is a moral patient with rights. This 
approach in argumentation is more successful for Lore, as Soong’s stance becomes 




increasingly ambiguous and eventually admits his failure after Lore demands he is owed 
compensation.   
Noticeably Lore criticizes Data only once for his immoral actions as he sarcastically 
thanks him from dooming him to drift in space in “Brothers”. The continuing critique 
towards only Soong highlights his importance in Lore’s life as a failed father figure. Sue 
Short discusses the same idea in her article, but from Data’s point of view. To her, the “most 
significant influence” in Data’s life is “having an educated liberal and moral man” in it as his 
father figure, namely Captain Picard, since he can guide Data, defend his rights, and show 
humanity “in its most virtuous light” (221). Short does not extend this same consideration to 
explain the actions of the so-called “deranged” brother (219), even though Lore’s only 
contact with humanity is his morally inconsistent father. Short is not the only one who 
reduces Lore to faulty parts and madness; for example, Esther Rashkin describes Lore as 
“Data’s sociopathic ‘evil twin’”, and suggests it was Lore’s emotions that made him the way 
he is instead of the immoral treatment he received (322). This reveals that even academic 
scholarship ignores the moral responsibility of the creator to the created AI even when the AI 
itself argues for moral patiency.  
Surprisingly, then, Lore appears as an advocate of the nonstandard position of 
morality. He believes he is a moral patient with rights, yet simultaneously he denies his own 
moral agency. He wishes for moral treatment from his father and compensation for his 




Lore’s moral status is an asymmetrical and contradictory position in which none of the 
analysed characters grant him a complete moral status, not even Lore himself. Lore is the 
only one to argue for his moral patiency, yet he is also the one who denies his moral agency 
alongside with Soong. Data’s position is surprising, because he is a similar android as Lore 
who has had to argue for his own moral status. Soong’s position is more typical, because he 
is the creator who takes responsibility for his creation; nevertheless, his double standard of 
treating Lore and Data differently despite their identical nature that Soong himself 
proclaimed is remarkable. Lore’s position, however, is the most surprising because of how he 
treats his own moral agency.  




Data and Lore appear as supporters of the nonstandard position of morality. In 
opposition, Soong appears as a possible advocate of both the nonstandard and the standard 
position due to his double standard, which appears morally inconsistent. What is more 
dubious, however, is Data supporting functionalism despite being a machine himself.  
It is notable that neither Data nor Soong ask themselves Levy’s question, namely, “Is 
it ethical to treat robots in such-and-such a way?” (209). It is an important question for 
discussion on morality, and especially important for Soong as the creator since he is not 
shown to have considered the ethical implications of building the androids. It is a possible 
topic for further analysis in this thesis’ topic. The analysis can also be continued by 
examining Lore’s treatment by other characters, such as Captain Picard, or by Starfleet in 
general.  
 In conclusion, Star Trek: The Next Generation is less inclusive of admitting machines 
into moral consideration than it appears. Data, an android who is not dangerous to humans 
and instead admires them considerably, is easily granted a moral status. Conflictingly, Lore is 
deemed increasingly dangerous and thus denied moral status. Despite the show attempting to 
display open-mindedness towards AI, the show anthropocentrically prioritises human safety 
over machine rights, and therefore does not support its ideal of equality between humans and 
machines. The Next Generation, therefore, fails in its own argument because of Lore’s moral 
status. 
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